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Abstract
This paper studies information transmission in social surveys where a welfare max-
imizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of individuals from a
large population who have heterogeneous preferences. The population distribution
of preferences is unknown and has to be estimated, based on answers from the re-
spondents. The decision maker cannot identify the true distribution of preferences
even if the sample size becomes arbitrarily large, since the respondents have incentive
to "exaggerate" their preferences especially as the sample size becomes larger and
each respondent has weaker inuence on the decision. The quality of communication
with each respondent may improve as the sample size becomes smaller, and thus we
identify the trade-o¤ between the quality and quantity of communication. We show
that the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when
the prior is weaker.
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1 Introduction
Good public policy requires a considerable amount of information about the preferences
of a¤ected individuals. In many instances, authorities, the press, and researchers collect
such information through consultation with representatives, polls of randomly selected
individuals, or referendums. Private rms may also be interested in communicating with
the public to nd their "tastes" for marketing purposes. Indeed, policy makersreliance
on opinion polls is well documented,1 and the design and analysis of surveys are central
concerns in marketing research.
It is widely recognized, however, that data collected through surveys may not reect
respondentstrue beliefs or opinions. In particular, a disproportionately high proportion
of respondents to social surveys tend to choose extreme answers, such as endpoints (e.g.
1 and 5, for a ve-point item) on a rating scale. This strongly suggests the presence of
a systematic bias in answering survey questions, and indicates that even in the absence
of (or after correcting for) selection bias, policy makers and researchers may still have to
take into account the possibility of misreporting, when estimating the "true" population
distribution.2
It should also be noted that the way questions are constructed can also a¤ect the
quality of information from respondents. For instance, in opinion polls on current or
proposed government policies, questions are asked often in a simple binary form "agree
or disagree", even when the preference intensity (how much they agree or disagree) varies
across individuals and such information can be of use for policy making. As of 2013 the UK
government has held eleven (consultative) referendums, the rst in 1973, all of which asked
"yes or no" questions.3 Interestingly, nine of the referendums were about devolution from
the central government to local authorities, for which people would have had a wide range
of preferences as to how much power should be devolved. Indeed, the actual policy space
is not binary either, as the central government ultimately determines the precise degree of
devolution, which can also be a¤ected by the margin of votes. Asking simple "yes or no"
questions seems to severely limit the information elicited from the public.4
1See e.g. Shapiro (2011) for a survey of the political science literature on the impact of polls on public
policies.
2For example, online product reviews have disproportionately high numbers of ve and one star ratings
(Hu et al., 2009). When asked the importance of the referendum on the independence of Scotland from the
United Kingdom on the scale of 1 ("should never be done") to 10 ("very important"), 20% (second highest
fraction) and 22% (highest fraction) of the sampled respondents gave 1 and 10, respectively (BBC, 2011).
See also e.g., Greenleaf (1992), Berinsky (2004), and De Jong et al. (2008) for evidence and discussions
on such extreme response bias.
3Parliamentary sovereignty in the UK implies no national referendums can be binding. Thus they are
thought of as information elicitation from the public to inform the central legislature.
4For example, the Welsh devolution referendum in 2011 asked the binary question "Do you want the
(Welsh) Assembly now to be able to make laws on all matters in the 20 subject areas it has powers for?".
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In contrast, small-scale eld surveys or consultations with community representatives
can be thought of as attempts to obtain more elaborate information from a limited number
of respondents. How would the size of a survey a¤ect the incidence of strategic misreport-
ing? If respondents answer strategically and not necessarily honestly, what are the e¤ective
ways to ask survey questions? Does a larger sample always lead to better estimation of
the underlying population distribution?
This paper explores the nature of communication for obtaining information about a
large population. We introduce uncertainty about the distribution of preferences into a
simple model that consists of an uninformed welfare maximizing decision maker (or a
researcher who informs the decision maker) and a continuum of individuals with hetero-
geneous preferences. Specically, we examine how cheap talk communication between the
decision maker and randomly sampled individuals changes according to the sample size
and the quality of the prior belief about the preference distribution of the population.
One of our main ndings is the trade-o¤ between quality of communication and sample
size. Needless to say, if every respondent fully reveals their true preference, the decision
maker is better o¤with a larger sample size as it renders the estimation of the distribution
of preferences more accurate. However, as the sample size increases, each respondent
has less inuence on the decision makers estimation of the preference distribution and
consequently her decision. This leads to incentive to "exaggerate" their preferences, in
the sense that if their type is high (low) they report that their type is even higher (lower)
than it actually is, which implies that the quality of information transmission between
the decision maker and each respondent diminishes as the sample size becomes larger. As
a result, the population distribution of preferences cannot be inferred precisely, even if
the sample size is arbitrarily large. Meanwhile, we also show that some information can
be transmitted regardless of sample size, since binary communication leaves no room for
exaggeration and thus is informative, although each piece of information obtained from
respondents is inevitably coarser than in more detailed communication.
Another related nding, which is perhaps more interesting, is that the decision maker
may be better o¤ with sampling a smaller number of individuals when the prior belief on
the population preferences is weaker. This somewhat counterintuitive result comes from
the fact that in communication with sampled individuals, each respondent plays not only
against the other respondents but also against the decision makers belief. If the prior belief
is weak (i.e. if there is less ex ante information about the population distribution), the
decision makers estimation of the population distribution is inuenced heavily by messages
from the sampled individuals. Therefore, each of them may have signicant inuence on
the decision makers belief and hence decision as long as the sample size is small, and thus
In theory, the referendum could have asked precisely which matters and which subject areas (including all
or none) they wanted legislation power for.
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they may reveal more information as they have less incentive to "exaggerate". This implies
that a larger sample size does not necessarily lead to better estimation, and the optimal
sample size may be bounded.
On the other hand, when the prior belief is strong and hence the decision maker is
more condent about the preference distribution, a respondent has little inuence on the
decision makers estimation of the population distribution even if the sample size is small,
because a strong prior means that the decision makers belief is hardly a¤ected by the
result of the survey. Consequently, each respondent has stronger incentive to "exaggerate"
just as in the case of larger sample size, and the available quality of communication may
hit the lower bound of binary communication even if, for example, only one respondent
is sampled. Insofar as the best available communication is binary, the decision maker can
better estimate the population distribution as the sample size becomes larger and thus the
optimal sample size is unbounded. This is in sharp contrast to the case where the prior is
weak and the optimal sample size is bounded.
The intuition developed in this paper sheds light on the strategic link between the size
of a survey and the quality of respondentsanswers, which can potentially be of practical
use. It indicates that, given the number of choices for questions in a survey, the larger
the number of respondents is, the more extreme responses we expect see and they have
to be "discounted" for reliable estimation of the population distribution. Asking binary
questions in a large survey has the advantage that no correction is required for the incen-
tive to exaggerate, while by design the information on the intensity of the respondents
preferences/opinions is lost. A small survey, where respondents may have less incentive to
exaggerate, can outperform a very large one in the estimation of the population distribu-
tion.
The feature that binary communication loses information about individualspreference
intensity is studied by Casella and Gelman (2008) for the design of referendums. In their
model the binary structure (voting in favour or against a proposal) is exogenous and the
decision maker is committed to a majority rule. In our model the decision maker best
responds to the communication outcome, as in opinion polls or non-binding referendums.
Moreover, binary communication in such large scale communication, which prevails in
reality, is endogenously derived in our model. The design problem for the decision maker
in the present paper is the size of a survey, which could range from a consultation with a
small number of individuals to a large scale opinion poll or non-binding referendum.
A recent paper by Morgan and Stocken (2008) studies information aggregation with
cheap talk communication.5 Similarly to ours, they consider a model with a decision
maker and a continuum of individuals with heterogeneous preferences. There are some
5See e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998) and Goeree and Großer (2007) for information ag-
gregation in the context of voting.
4
important di¤erences. First, Morgan and Stocken (2008) assume that the message space is
binary, so that they do not analyze how the number of messages in equilibrium changes due
to the respondentsstrategic incentive. Second, since they assume that the distribution of
biases of the individuals is known and aggregate uncertainty is only about the distribution
of binary signals they receive, information typically aggregates as the size of a poll becomes
arbitrarily large. This implies that if polling is costless, the decision maker always prefers
to poll an arbitrarily large number of individuals.6 In our model, on the other hand,
information does not aggregate due to the complexity of the underlying state and the
limited informativeness of equilibrium communication. A striking result that follows from
the complexity is that even if polling is completely costless, the decision maker may prefer
to sample a small number of individuals because the quality of communication becomes
higher. Therefore we are able to address the natural question of the optimal sample size,
and moreover illustrate its relation to the quality of the prior belief, which Morgan and
Stocken (2008) do not examine.
Kawamura (2011) develops a similar setting to the one in the present paper, and studies
how the (nite) number of interested parties a¤ects information transmission from them.
He shows that the most informative equilibrium becomes less precise but converges to
binary communication as the number of interested parties increases since, as in the present
paper, binary messages do not allow exaggeration. However, while Kawamura (2011) o¤ers
an insight into why large-scale polls often use binary questions, he assumes that the decision
maker communicates with all individuals a¤ected by the decision, which implies the model
does not capture important aspects of poll design, namely how large the sample for a
poll should be and how the size of a poll a¤ects the informativeness of each response. In
contrast, the present paper assumes that the population size is innite throughout, but
the number of randomly sampled individuals the decision maker communicates with is a
choice variable. This enables us to study the trade-o¤ between quality and quantity of
communication in polls, in relation to the possibility of misreporting and optimal sample
size.
The intuition behind the quality-quantity trade-o¤ we study in the present paper is
somewhat related to that of the literature on committee design (Mukhopadhaya, 2003;
Persico, 2004; Gerardi and Yariv, 2008; Gershkov and Szentes, 2009; Koriyama and Szentes,
2009). In that literature, the optimal committee size is typically nite because committee
members engage in costly information acquisition, which is subject to the free-rider problem
even when the members have identical preferences. In our model, every agent (whether
sampled or not) is endowed with private information, which represents their heterogeneous
preferences.
6Also, in Morgan and Stocken (2008) the individuals have both common (ideological) interest and
private interest, while we focus the heterogeneity in their private interest.
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Other papers that study communication with multiple (mostly two) informed parties
include Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1989), Austen-Smith (1993), Krishna and Morgan
(2001), Ottaviani and Sørensen (2001), Wolinsky (2002), Battaglini (2002, 2004), Le Que-
ment (2009), and Ishida and Shimizu (2012). Those papers assume that the number of
agents who communicate with the decision maker is either xed, or up to two.
Misreporting in surveys has attracted considerable attention in social studies including
social psychology, marketing science, and political science, to name a few. Outside of
the economics literature, exaggeration by respondents is often attributed to psychological,
cultural and cognitive factors (e.g. Greenleaf, 1992; Berinsky, 2004; and De Jong et al.,
2008). In contrast, the present paper o¤ers a model with strategic misreporting, which
may be particularly relevant to situations where the result of a survey is likely to inuence
public policy that in turn a¤ects the welfare of a large number of individuals in a substantive
manner.
To our knowledge, this paper o¤ers a rst attempt to incorporate complex population
uncertainty, which is certainly of interest in public decision making, into a strategic setting.
Estimation of distributions is known to be computationally intensive, and in order to keep
tractability we introduce the Dirichlet distribution, which is a multinomial extension of
the beta distribution.7 The Dirichlet allows us to explicitly compute posteriors for a rich
message structure (including partial pooling of types) and we can easily parametrize the
strength of the prior belief/knowledge, which captures how much the decision maker (such
as government) is informed about the population before she engages in communication.
The rest of the present paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the model,
and Section 3 examines the relationship among informative equilibria, sample size, and
the quality of the prior. Section 4 considers the trade-o¤ between quality and quantity of
communication and the optimal sample size. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
Our model consists of a single decision maker and a continuum of individuals. Every
individual is labelled by a real number a 2 [0; 1] and has type (preference) a 2   R.
The number of types is H  3, where the types are ordered such that h < h+1, for
h = 1; 2; :::; H. The location for each type h is xed and common knowledge. We assume
that the individuals have a quadratic payo¤ function (y a)2, where y 2 R is the decision
makers policy. Clearly an individuals payo¤ is higher as y becomes closer to his type a,
and the "ideal" policy for individual a is y = a. The decision makers objective is to
7See DeGroot (1970) pp.49-51, 174-175. We also use formulas from Dickey et al. (1987). The Dirichlet
distribution has been used in the economic literature for (non-strategic) search from an unknown distrib-
ution (e.g. Rothschild, 1974; Talmain, 1992).
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maximize utilitarian "social welfare"
 
HX
i=1
qi(y   i)2; (1)
where qi  0 denotes the proportion of individuals whose type is i, such thatPHi=1 qi = 1.
Since y a¤ects all the individuals with di¤erent types, the decision maker is unable to
implement the ideal policy for every individual (or type). Instead she chooses the policy
that maximizes the total "welfare" of the individuals(1).
The decision maker does not observe the frequency vector q  (q1; :::; qH) or any in-
dividualstypes directly. Each individual a learns only his own type a. Therefore, the
decision maker communicates with randomly sampled n individuals to estimate q. In par-
ticular, the selected individuals independently send cheap talk messages to the decision
maker. In other words, communication is assumed to be completely costless and payo¤
irrelevant, and does not depend on n. We allow n to be any nite number, which can be
arbitrarily large.8 Also, n is assumed to be common knowledge, which implies that the
sampled individuals (respondents) know the size of the survey.9
We assume that the frequency vector q follows the Dirichlet distribution with parame-
ters   (1; 2:::; H) = (0p1; 0p2:::; 0pH) such that 0 > 0, pi > 0 for all i = 1; :::; H,
and
PH
i=1 p
i = 1. It follows that
PH
i=1 
i =
PH
i=1 
0pi = 0. The density function with
respect to the frequency vector q is given by
f(q;) =
  (0)QH
i=1   (
i)
HY
i=1
 
xi
i 1
;
where  () denotes the gamma function
 () 
Z 1
0
t 1e tdt for  > 0:
The density function may look complex but a convenient and intuitive feature of the
Dirichlet is that the marginal distribution of qi is the beta distribution B(i; 0   i).
This implies that the prior expectation of the frequency of the ith type is
E[qi] =
i
0
=
0pi
0
= pi. (2)
Therefore we can see p  (p1; p2; :::; pH) as the expected prior population distribution
of preferences. The decision maker and all individuals share the same prior, before the
8We rule out the case where n is innitely large, so that each respondents message has some (however
small) inuence on the decision makers belief and policy.
9In practice, respondents should be able to have a good idea about the size of a survey, from the way
the survey is conducted and how it is publicized. For instance, detailed in-person interviews would be
adopted for a relatively small sample, while phone polls or online questionnaire would typically be used
for a larger sample.
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individuals learn their types. In our common prior Bayesian framework, each individual
updates his belief on the population distribution through his own type, while the decision
maker updates her belief on the population distribution through n messages she receives
from the respondents. Let the prior expected mean of the individualstypes be
 
HX
i=1
pii:
For expositional convenience we assume  6= i for all i = 1; :::; H. In other words, we
rule out the non-generic case where the prior mean coincides exactly with one of the
types. Suppose that every respondent reveals their type truthfully. Let x = (x1; :::; xH)
be the count vector where xi denote the number of individuals whose type is i, out of
n respondents. Clearly we have
PH
i=1 x
i = n. From the decision makers viewpoint the
posterior distribution of qi is the beta distribution B(i + xi; 0   i + n   xi) and the
expected frequency qi conditional on xi is given by
E[qi j xi] = 
0pi + xi
0 + n
: (3)
This reects the convenient property of the Dirichlet distribution that the posterior of qi
is a¤ected only by xi and the sample size n, and not by the count of any other individual
x i.
From each individuals viewpoint, after he learns his type a = 
i, the posterior distrib-
ution of the probability mass of his type, qi, is B(i + 1; 0 i). That of any other type,
denoted by q i, is given by B( i; 0    i + 1). Hence we obtain(
E[qi j a = i] = 0pi+10+1
E[q i j a = i] = 0p i0+1
(4)
That is, (4) describes the expected posterior distribution of the population preferences
from the viewpoint of an individual whose type is i. Note that each individual updates
his belief according to the sample size of 1, which is his own type.
The Dirichlet distribution is used widely in problems where the underlying distribution
is unknown. It provides a tractable way to model a "distribution of distributions". By
construction, the expected prior distribution p can be completely arbitrary. Furthermore,
0 can be interpreted as the "strength" of the prior belief. That is, from (3) the "sensitivity"
of the posterior with respect to the count vector of the respondentstypes
E[qi j xi]
xi
(5)
is strictly decreasing in 0. This implies that the prior is inuenced by the sample less (and
hence the prior belief is "stronger"), as 0 becomes larger.10 In addition, 0 can also be
10We can also see 0 as inversely related to the informativeness (strength) of a given set of data.
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seen as the level of ex ante aggregate uncertainty, conditional on prior common knowledge
about the population distribution. When 0 is high, the realized population distribution
is likely to be similar to the prior. For example, if 0 ! 1 then E[qi j xi] ! E[qi] = pi
for any xi. In this case, the prior is identical to the posterior (and hence the realized
population distribution) with probability 1, which corresponds to a completely known
population distribution (i.e. no aggregate uncertainty). Consequently the decision maker
can choose the (near) rst-best policy even without any communication. In contrast, when
0 is a nite number, the realized distribution may well be di¤erent from the prior and
there is uncertainty in the population distribution of preferences.
From an individuals perspective, the other individualstypes are correlated with his
own since (4) implies E[qi j a = i] > E[qi] for nite 0. The level of correlation is
decreasing in 0, as we have
dE[qi j a = i]
d0
< 0:
In other words, the lower 0 is, the more likely the others are of his type. In particular, if
0 ! 0 we have E[qi j a = i]! 1, which means the other individualstypes are perfectly
correlated with his (i.e. all the others share the same type as his own). Thus aggregate
uncertainty implies correlation of types (and vice versa) in the present framework. The
link between the weakness of the prior as measured in (5) and correlation takes an extreme
form under the Dirichlet assumption especially for 0 close to 0. As we will see later,
what is necessary for the intuition behind our results is that, an additional observation of a
particular type skews the posterior towards that type, and the magnitude of the additional
skew is parametrized monotonically by a single variable (0 under the Dirichlet). This
feature requires some form of correlation of types but not necessarily the Dirichlet (apart
from its tractability). For example, the same intuition would hold if from an individuals
viewpoint the types of the others are correlated not only to his own type but also types
close to his.11
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. All individuals and the decision maker are endowed with a common prior on the
preference distribution;
2. individuals privately learn their types;
11The negative association between the strength of the prior and correlation follows directly from the
Dirichlet assumption. The covariance of any two di¤erent types is given by  
i i
(0)2(0+1)
, so that any type is
negatively correlated with the other types. In particular, from each individuals viewpoint the correlation is
with respect to his own type only, and not to any other types. This suggests that each type in our discrete
type space could be better interpreted as a simplied representation of (possibly continuous) types that
are close to each other and positively correlated.
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3. The decision maker randomly samples n individuals who report costless, non-veriable
messages;
4. The decision maker estimates the population distribution from the messages and
chooses y;
5. Payo¤s are realized.
In what follows we introduce the possibility that the individuals may not fully reveal
their types. In particular, we will see that the type space may be partitioned. Note that
while the decision maker has n pieces of information (messages), each individual has only
one (his own type).
3 Equilibrium
Throughout this paper we focus on symmetric partitional strategies of the individuals, in
which there are K non-overlapping groups, each of which consists of one or more consec-
utive type indices. Naturally we have K  H, that is, the number of groups is weakly
smaller than the number of types. Any respondents in the same type group induce (from
their viewpoint) the same distribution of policy by the decision maker, and without loss of
generality we assume that all respondents in the same group send an identical message.12
As in any cheap talk models, there may be multiple equilibria in our model, and in par-
ticular for any parameter values there exists an uninformative ("babbling") equilibrium
where all respondents send uninformative messages and the decision maker chooses her
policy based only on her prior. However, the decision maker is strictly better o¤ in an in-
formative equilibrium as she can use additional information from respondents to maximize
her conditional expected payo¤. This also implies that all individuals are ex ante better
o¤ in an informative equilibrium than in the uninformative equilibrium, since ex ante they
share common interest with the decision maker. In what follows we will derive informative
equilibria of the game.
Let Gk be the set of type indices in the kth group from the left hand side of the type
space. For example, if K = H each type reports a distinct message to the decision maker,
and Gk = fkg. On the other hand, if K = 1, then G1 contains all types: G1 = f1; 2; ::; Hg.
Let z  (z1; :::; zk; :::; zK) be the count vector of messages from the respondents in each
12Respondents in the same group do not have to send the identical message, as long as they induce
the same probability distribution of policy (or equivalently the same belief of the decision maker on their
types). However, such an equilibrium is outcome equivalent to the one where all respondents in the same
group send an identical message, in the sense that the same combination of the respondentstypes results
in the same policy.
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group. Naturally we have
PK
k=1 z
k = n. The rst order condition with respect to (1) gives
the decision makers best response conditional on the messages:
y(z) =
HX
i=1
E[qi j z] i; (6)
where E[qi j z] is the posterior expected frequency of type i.
Let G(i) denote the set of type indices (group) that has i as an element. By denition,
if i+1 2 G(i) then G(i) = G(i+1). If type i is in the kth group, then G(i) = Gk. Suppose
that all types in G(i) send the same message to the decision maker and hence she cannot
tell exactly how many of the respondents are of type i. The expected frequency of each
type i, conditional on the count vector of messages z is given by
E[qi j z] = 
0
P
l2G(i) p
l + z(i)
0 + n| {z }
expected frequency of G(i)
piP
l2G(i) p
l| {z }
weight within G(i)
; (7)
where z(i) denotes the number of respondents in G(i), i.e. z(i)  Pl2G(i) xl.13 Since the
decision maker does not observe xi directly for group G(i) that contains two or more types,
the estimation of qi is more complex than in (3), where xi is known. We can interpret the
construction of (7) in the following two steps: i) we rst calculate the expected frequency
of G(i) respect to the other groups; and ii) "allocate" the expected frequency of the group
according to the relative prior frequency (weight) of i within the group. The rst step is
analogous to (3) but here the di¤erence is that the numerator involves the sum of prior
frequencies and the number of messages for the group, rather than those of a specic type.
From each respondents viewpoint, his message induces a distribution of the decision
makers policy, which is inuenced also by the other respondentsmessages. Note from (6)
and (7) that, for any possible count vector of the other respondents, the di¤erence in the
induced policy by sending two di¤erent messages, respectively for Gj (thereby increasing
zj by one) and Gk (increasing zk by one), is given byX
i2Gj
1
0 + n
piP
l2Gj p
l
i  
X
i2Gk
1
0 + n
piP
l2Gk p
l
i; (8)
which is independent from the messages from the other respondents. This implies that from
each respondents viewpoint his message inuences the expectation but not the variance of
the policy. Therefore, as we assume quadratic payo¤s, we can focus on the expected policy
induced by each message when we consider a respondents strategy.
Every individual updates his own belief on the population distribution, according to
his own type. Given that the individuals type is i, the types of all the other individuals
13See Dickey et al. (1987), pp777-780.
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are Dirichlet distributed with parameters 0 = (1; :::; i+1; :::; H). This implies that the
posterior distribution of his own type is B(i + 1; 0   i) while that of the other types is
B( i; 0    i + 1), where  i denotes a type other than i:
If the underlying preference distribution is Dirichlet distributed, the count vector x fol-
lows the multivariate Pólya distribution (also known as the Dirichlet compound multino-
mial distribution):
Pr(x j ) = n!
Hi=1(x
i!)
  (0)
  (0 + n)
HY
i=1
  (i + xi)
  (i)
;
where xi is the number of respondents whose type is i.
Let us consider the respondentschoice of messages. We denote the message sent by
any individuals in G(i) by m(i); and the message sent by any individuals in Gj by mj. If
a respondents type is i and he sends the message m(i), then his expected payo¤ is given
by
u(i;m(i)) =
 
nX
x1=0
n x1X
x2=0
:::
n x1 ;:::; xH 1X
xH=0
Pr(x j 0)
 
i  
HX
t=1
E[qt j z1; :::; z(i) + 1; :::; zK ] t
!2
;
where zk =
P
l2Gk x
l for k = 1; :::; K. If he deviates and mimics a type in the jth group
such that Gj 6= G(i), then
u(i;mj) =
 
nX
x1=0
n x1X
x2=0
:::
n x1 ;:::; xH 1X
xH=0
Pr(x j 0)
 
i  
HX
t=1
E[qt j z1; :::; zj + 1; :::; z(i); ::; zK ] t
!2
:
Note that the expected payo¤function u(i; ) already incorporates (6), the decision makers
best response to the messages from the respondents given that all of them follow the
partitional strategy. Hence partitional strategies form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if,
for any i
u(i;m(i))  u(i;mj) 8mj = m1;m2; :::;mK :
The expected payo¤ function u(i; ) is complex, but since the original payo¤ function is
quadratic, for each respondents best response conditional on his type, we can focus on the
decision makers expected policy (from a respondents viewpoint) induced by his message.
Specically, it su¢ ces to nd which message induces the expected policy closest to his ideal
policy a.
How does communication between the decision maker and the respondents take place
in equilibrium? As we will see clearly in the next section, unlike cheap talk models with
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continuous types there can be a fully revealing equilibrium when the prior is weak (0 low)
and the sample size is small. Since in such a case each respondent has relatively large
inuence on the policy and thus less incentive to exaggerate, the best response is to reveal
his type truthfully rather than mimicking another type and thereby shifting the expected
policy further away from his ideal.14 This points to the possibility that we have more
informative equilibria with each responder, when a small sample size is combined with a
weak prior.
Meanwhile, the following proposition states that, when the prior belief about the pop-
ulation distribution is strong enough, generically the only informative equilibrium commu-
nication is the one that can be played with binary messages (e.g. "yes or no"). In this
equilibrium, the respondentstypes are partitioned into only two groups, and any respon-
dent from a group induces the same belief as the other respondents in the group. In other
words, the decision maker can correctly infer to which of the two type groups a respondent
belongs, but cannot precisely know the respondents type.
Proposition 1 If the prior belief about the population distribution of preferences is suf-
ciently strong (0 is su¢ ciently large), a binary equilibrium in which only two messages
are used exists for any sample size n, whereby all types below the ex ante average type 
send one message and those above  send the other. The binary equilibrium is the only
informative equilibrium in partitional strategy.
Proof. See Appendix I.
As we have already suggested in the Introduction, this proposition has a simple in-
tuition. Note that, the prior stronger is, the smaller inuence each respondent has on
the decision makers belief and hence her policy, regardless of the sample size. Also, the
expected prior policy from each respondents viewpoint becomes closer to the prior expec-
tation . Suppose there are three or more groups (K  3) partitioning the type space,
and consider a middle group which is neither the bottom G1 or the top GK . When 0 is
high, a respondent in such a group whose ideal policy is lower (higher) than  deviates and
mimics one in a lower (higher) group, since by doing so he can render the expected policy
closer to his ideal. In other words, respondents whose types are above  wish to overstate
their types as much as they can, and respondents below  understate their types as much
as they can. Binary communication is "robust" to the incentive to exaggerate, because the
respondents may not possibly exaggerate their types when they have the choice between
two messages (above or below ).
A larger sample size has a similar e¤ect on communication to a stronger prior, in that
it weakens the decision makers response to each respondents message.
14If the type space is continuous, even innitesimally small incentive to exaggerate leads to misreport
as a neighbourhood type, so that the fully revealing equilibrium would not exist.
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Proposition 2 For sample size n su¢ ciently large, either i) no informative equilibrium in
partitional strategy exists; or ii) the most informative equilibrium in partitional strategy
is binary.
Proof. See Appendix I.
When a large sample size is combined with a moderate or strong prior, it leads to binary
communication for essentially the same reason and intuition as in Proposition 1: if there
are more than three groups, respondent types in a middle group deviate and mimic one
in an extreme group due to their weak inuence on the policy.15 On the other hand, if
the prior is extremely weak, even binary communication equilibrium may not exist for a
very large sample size since types close to the boundary types in the binary partition has
incentive to deviate.
Note that when 0 is close to 0 a large proportion of the population are likely to
be concentrated on one type due to high correlation. Consider the highest type in the
lower group of a binary partition. From the viewpoint of a respondent who nds himself
having this type, the expected action (given that the other respondents follow the binary
partitional strategy) will be lower than his ideal, since the other respondents are very likely
to share the type and induce the decision makers belief that their expected type is the
expected type of the lower group, not the highest type in the group. Thus, the respondent
may mimic a type in the higher group to render the expected policy higher, which upsets
the binary equilibrium.
This does not imply that there is no informative equilibrium. In fact, even for small
0 and large n there could be a mixed strategy equilibrium where respondents randomize
their messages. Unfortunately it is impossible to characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium
since the posterior is no longer the Dirichlet and hence does not have a closed form.16
However, in our framework very small 0 has a somewhat unrealistic feature that, due to
high correlation, a vast majority of the individuals is likely to be concentrated on one type,
which the decision maker does not know. In practice, such situations may be of less interest
because there is little conict of interest between the decision maker and any individuals.
In what follows we focus on 0 such that a binary equilibrium exists, which implies we
expect to see at least some dispersion of realized preferences.
15Kawamura (2011) has given a related proposition but with a nite number of individuals all of whom
send a message to the decision maker (hence there is no sampling), where the decision maker concerns only
the types of those individuals, not the underlying probability distribution of types itself. In the present
framework the decision makers Bayesian updating is much more complex because she has to estimate
the entire population distribution regardless of the sample size n. In other words, the decision maker has
to assign a (strictly positive) posterior probability mass to all possible types 1; 2; :::; H even when the
sample size is very small or when no respondent turns out to be of certain types.
16Moreover, as there is no guarantee that messages shift the policy linearly, we cannot focus on the
expectation of y and have to take into account the variance, which also makes our analysis intractable.
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Figure 1: Two observationally equivalent preference distributions for binary data
It is easy to see that, given binary communication, the decision maker can never esti-
mate the preference distribution precisely. Figure 1 shows an example of two distributions
that the decision maker is unable to distinguish even if the sample size is arbitrarily large:
she can (almost) precisely estimate the proportions of the individuals are below and above
, but she can never accurately infer how the types are distributed above . This makes
it impossible for the decision maker to implement the rst best policy for any sample size,
and suggests the possibility that limiting the sample size may improve the decision makers
estimation, which is the focus of the next section.
Propositions 1 and 2 assume that there does not exist a type that coincides with the
prior expected mean . If such a type exists, this type does not have incentive to exaggerate
as his posterior expectation on the other respondentstypes also coincides with his type
and the most informative equilibrium features three groups, not two. Clearly, when H  4,
even if we have ternary communication where all individuals whose type coincides with 
send a distinct message, there does not exist a fully revealing equilibrium for large n or 0.
So far we have assumed H  3, so as to capture the complexity of the population
distribution of preferences. When the distribution has a simpler form, information does
aggregate for large n, as already found in e.g. Morgan and Stocken (2008):
Remark 1 If there are only two types (H = 2), then the binary communication (full
revelation) equilibrium exists for any 0 and n. The information aggregates for n arbitrarily
large.
With two types, each type renders the decision makers action closer to their ideal only
by revealing truthfully, since mimicking the other type merely shifts it away from his ideal
policy. That is, there is neither any room for exaggeration nor incentive to misreport, and
hence respondents reveal their types truthfully. Remark 1 highlights the importance of
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the complexity (specically, the presence of varying preference intensity) in the underlying
preference distribution for our analysis.
What if the decision makers action y is binary for exogenous reasons? This may apply
to, for instance, the ratication of a treaty or the choice of two candidates for a particular
position who are perfectly committed to xed policies. If the preferences are also binary
(H = 2), then there is no strategic incentive to misreport and the decision maker knows
the true distribution. However, if H  3, while the decision maker wants to implement the
action closer to the average type of the population, it may not be correctly estimated even
with an arbitrarily large sample, for the same reason as in the case where the policy space
is continuous. To see this, suppose the prior distribution is such that the decision makers
optimal choice from the two possible actions y 2 fy0; y1g  R changes according to the
true population distribution. Then if the decision maker takes the respondentsmessages
at face value, every non-extreme respondent has incentive to mimic the extreme type whose
favoured policy is the same as his. This does not depend on the sample size, because even
if a non-extreme respondent has large inuence on policy (because of small 0 or n), he
does not gain by revealing truthfully since the policy cannot be "ne-tuned" in response
to his message.17 At the same time, the binary equilibrium exists as it is consistent with
the respondentsincentive. The above discussion is summarized as follows:
Remark 2 If the policy space is binary and there are three or more types (H  3), then
the binary equilibrium is the only informative partitional equilibrium for any sample size.
Remarks 1 and 2 indicate that both type space and policy space have to be richer
than binary for sample size to a¤ect the quality of communication. However, as we have
discussed in the Introduction, in many situations of interest the actual policy space is
much richer than binary, while it may well be presented as binary in large-scale surveys or
referendums. Indeed, in light of Proposition 2 we can understand such binary questions as
an equilibrium outcome under a non-binary environment. In the following, we return to
H  3 and continuous policy space to study the choice of sample size.
4 Sample Size and Quality-Quantity Trade-o¤
In the previous sections we have seen that the sample size may be negatively associated
with the quality of each message. Meanwhile, it is clear that given the quality (infor-
mativeness) of communication between the decision maker and each individual, a larger
sample size allows the decision maker to estimate the population distribution more accu-
rately. This suggests an interesting trade-o¤ between quality and quantity of messages
17In other words, all he can do is to increase the probability of his preferred policy (between the two)
being implemented, by pretending to be an extreme type.
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from respondents.
When the underlying uncertainty on the preference distribution is simple, even coarse
communication may allow the decision maker to identify the population distribution pre-
cisely, as the sample size becomes arbitrarily large. This is the case, for example, when the
population distribution is normal with an unknown mean, where the exact proportion of
the individuals below or above a threshold type gives su¢ cient information to precisely in-
fer the entire distribution. The Dirichlet has much less structure on its posterior. Hence in
order for the decision maker to estimate the population distribution exactly, every respon-
dent must reveal truthfully and also the sample size must be arbitrarily large. However,
from Proposition 2 we know that this cannot be an equilibrium outcome.
In the following we study how the decision makers ex ante expected equilibrium payo¤
("social welfare") changes according to the number of respondents, by assuming that the
decision maker can commit to a sample size and the respondents know it. This is an impor-
tant assumption in our model not least because conditional on a certain number of received
messages from the respondents, the decision maker is always tempted to sample more to
estimate the population distribution better.18 Likewise, individuals in the population who
are not sampled would always like to communicate and inuence the policy in their favour.
If the decision maker cannot commit to an announced sample size, the respondents would
anticipate that the actual sample size is arbitrarily large, in which case only binary commu-
nication is available. However, if the decision maker has to choose her policy immediately
after communication (and no time is left for a second round communication) then this time
constraint itself may function as a commitment device.
The decision makers expected payo¤ conditional on the sample size n and the best
response (6) is computed by
uDM(n) =  
nX
x1=0
n x1X
x2=0
:::
n x1 ;:::; xH 1X
xH=0
Pr(x j )| {z }
dist. of type counts
 
HX
i=1
E[qi j z]  y(z)  i2!| {z }
exp. payo¤ conditional on message counts
; (9)
where Pr(x j ) denotes the multivariate Pólya distribution, z = (z1; ::; zK) is the count
vector of the messages in a partitional equilibrium and zk =
P
l2Gk x
l as described above.
Let us observe the quality-quantity trade-o¤ through an example, the details of which
can be found in Appendix II. Table 1 presents the decision makers ex ante expected payo¤
(i.e. ex ante "social welfare") according to sample size n when H = 3 (1 = 0, 2 = 1=2,
3 = 1) and the prior expected mean  = 7=16 < 1=2. In this example the middle type
18Throughout this paper we maintain the assumption that the decision maker does not commit to any
decision rule that ex ante species the policy to be implemented according to the messages sent. This
assumption would be appropriate to analyze information transmission through interviews with represen-
tatives, opinion polls, and non-binding referendums where the decision maker determines the policy after
obtaining information from a population.
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0 = 1:5
n full binary
0  0:0898
1 * 0:0742  0:0788
2 * 0:0678  0:0742
3 * 0:0643  0:0717
4 * 0:0621  0:0702
5 * 0:0606  0:0691
6 N/A  0:0683
!1 N/A * 0:0633
0 = 4:5
n full binary
0  0:0898
1 N/A  0:0877
2 N/A * 0:0863
3 N/A * 0:0852
4 N/A * 0:0844
5 N/A * 0:0837
6 N/A * 0:0832
!1 N/A * 0:0782
Table 1: Decision makers expected payo¤ (= "social welfare") when 1 = 0; 2 = 1=2; 3 =
0; p1 = 2=8; p2 = 5=8; p3 = 1=8. An asterisk(*) denotes social welfare in neologism proof
equilibrium.
2, which is above the expected mean, has incentive to exaggerate and mimic the high
type 3. There are multiple equilibria in this game, and the payo¤ in the uninformative
equilibrium is the same as that of no communication at all n = 0. The most informative
equilibrium in partitional strategy is either fully revealing, in which case each type i for
i = 1; 2; 3 sends a distinct message; or binary, in which case respondents with 1 and 2
send the same message and those with 3 send a separate message.
Assuming that all respondents play the same equilibrium strategy, we can see that,
if 0 = 1:5 and the most informative equilibrium is chosen, the social welfare is non-
monotonic in the sample size since the welfare under full revelation for n = 5 ( 0:0606) is
higher than the welfare under binary communication for n = 6 ( 0:0683). Moreover, the
social welfare for n = 5 is higher than for n!1, which implies that the optimal sample
size is bounded even if sampling itself is completely costless. This is because for n  6
the incentive to exaggerate is so strong for the respondents that, there does not exist an
equilibrium where every type reveals truthfully. When the prior is stronger (the expected
payo¤s are listed for 0 = 4:5), each respondent has weaker inuence on the decision
makers posterior hence her policy as we have seen in (3). This leads to larger incentive
to exaggerate even if the sample size is very small. Consequently the only informative
partitional equilibrium is binary, regardless of the sample size. Therefore, the expected
social welfare is monotonically increasing in the sample size n.
The two cases in Table 1 indicate that, given the same expected prior distribution,
the decision maker may prefer to sample a smaller number of individuals when the prior
is weaker. Figure 2 shows how the optimal sample size changes according to 0. As we
discussed in the previous section, when 0 is very small the binary equilibrium may not
exist. In this example 0  4=3 guarantees its existence for any n. It is easy to check
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n = 5
n = 4
n = 3
n
1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
0
0.072
0.070
0.068
0.066
0.064
0.062
0.060
Welfare
Figure 2: Welfare under full (n) and binary (n!1) communication
that the largest sample size that supports full revelation, denoted by n, is decreasing in 0.
Intuitively, as the decision makers belief is less inuenced by the respondentsmessages, the
incentive to exaggerate becomes stronger, which makes it harder to sustain full revelation.
The solid lines in Figure 2 represent the welfare under full revelation with the largest feasible
sample size, and the dashed line represents the welfare under binary communication with
an arbitrary large sample.19 We can observe that, for 0  4=3; the optimal sample size is
5 up to 0  1:562, and 4 when 0 is between 1:562 and 1:633. For 0 larger than 1:633,
although full communication can be supported in an equilibrium for small n, the optimal
sample size is unbounded. Thus the optimal sample size is non-monotonic in the strength
of the prior.
Our argument regarding optimal sample size is based on symmetric strategies. In prin-
ciple, if we allow asymmetric strategies, having a larger sample than the "optimal" one
above may never hurt, since those additionally respondents can play the uninformative
equilibrium without decreasing the welfare. However, we can interpret our result with
asymmetric strategies (or equilibrium), as long as we dene optimal sample size to be the
smallest n that yields the highest welfare. This can be justied, for example, if there is a
small sampling cost that is increasing in n and the decision maker knows which communica-
tion equilibrium she will play when deciding n. Alternatively, we can use the uninformative
equilibrium for respondents beyond n as a justication for pre-determined sample size: even
19The reason why the welfare is decreasing in 0 is that the prior expected distribution is relatively
dispersed in this setup. In general, if the population is dispersed the welfare tends to be lower, and here
higher 0 means that the realized distribution is indeed more likely to be dispersed. When the prior
expected distribution is concentrated, the welfare in an informative equilibrium can be increasing in 0.
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without commitment to sample size n, the decision maker can play the most informative
equilibrium with n respondents, and the uninformative equilibrium with the others.
The discussion in this section can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 If the prior belief about the population distribution of preferences is su¢ -
ciently strong (0 is su¢ ciently large), the optimal sample size is unbounded. Otherwise,
the relationship between social welfare and sample size may be non-monotonic and the op-
timal sample size may be bounded. The relationship between 0 and the optimal sample
size may be non-monotonic.
The result that the optimal sample size is unbounded when 0 is su¢ ciently large
follows from Proposition 1: if binary communication is the only informative equilibrium,
then a larger sample unambiguously leads to higher welfare.
We have focused on perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game, but in practice, respon-
dents to a survey may not necessarily answer the questions and instead might communicate
in their own way. For example, a respondent may send a detailed message about his pref-
erence, even when he is asked a "yes or no" question. How would the decision maker
react to such an o¤-the-equilibrium message? As indicated in Table 1, the binary equilib-
rium is "neologism proof" (Farrell, 1993) with a large sample size and/or 0, which means
binary communication is not only simple but also robust to potential o¤-the-equilibrium
messages.20 In other words, any non-binary (perhaps more detailed) o¤-the-equilibrium
message by a respondent cannot be credible and hence must be no more informative than
a binary message.
The intuition for the robustness of binary communication can be presented somewhat
more precisely as follows. Note that in the example of this section, 1 and 2 are the types
of respondents who may wish to send a more "detailed" message because they pool and
send the same coarse message in equilibrium. Clearly a respondent whose type is 1 wishes
separate himself from 2 by using an o¤-the-equilibrium message (neologism), because if
he successfully convinces the decision maker of his type he can render the policy lower
and thus closer to his ideal. However, since 2 is lower than the prior mean  = 7=16,
their incentive under large sample size and/or 0 is also that they want to convince the
decision maker that their type is extreme (1) by using a neologism. Insofar as both 1
and 2 in the binary equilibrium want to convince the decision maker that their type is 1,
such a neologism can never be credible (because both types would use it), and indeed no
more informative than the original binary communication where 1 and 2 send the same
message. This also implies that in order to play the binary equilibrium with a large sample
size the decision maker does not need commitment to the restricted message space.
20See Appendix II for a detailed discussion on neologism proofness in the example of this section.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied information transmission in communication with sampled individ-
uals from a large population. Our results shed light on the design and interpretation of
small to large scale social surveys and non-binding referendums, which have substantial
inuence on public decisions in reality. The model developed in this paper o¤ers an insight
into why large surveys and referendums ask simple, often binary "yes or no", questions; and
why they attract extreme responses systematically when non-binary questions are asked.
In particular, we highlight the trade-o¤ between the quality and quantity communication
caused by respondentsstrategic incentive to misreport. Since a large sample size may di-
minish the quality of communication with each respondent, the optimal sample size may be
bounded, even if communication and information processing are completely costless. We
have demonstrated that this is especially the case when the prior belief on the population
distribution of preferences is weak.
Throughout this paper we have assumed the decision maker can commit to a sample
size. Perfect commitment to a sample size may seem contradictory to the assumption that
the decision maker optimally responds to messages without committing to a mechanism.
However, if the decision maker has to choose her policy immediately after communication
(and no time is left for a second round communication) then this time constraint itself may
function as a commitment device: the decision maker may credibly sample a xed number
of individuals to ask their preferences.
For a decision maker who is not time constrained, a natural extension of our model
is sequential sampling. In this case, the commitment problem seems severer because the
decision maker will always be tempted to ask more individuals, as long as communication
is costless and there is no time constraint. We could introduce a cost of sampling, in
which case the decision maker will determine when to stop sampling, depending on the
information she has obtained. If the decision maker can set the cost of sampling, it may
become a commitment device to sampling a small number of individuals. We would then
have to give up our parametric Bayesian approach as there is no known analytical solution
for the optimal stopping problem when the type space is non-binary.
6 Appendix I
6.1 Proposition 1
Proof. Consider an arbitrary partition of the type space f1; 2; :::; Hg into J( H)
disjoint groups. Let (j;1) be the lowest and (j;Sj) be the highest type in the jth group
that consists of Sj types. Let  : (j; s) 7! f1; 2; :::; Hg be a function from the identity of
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a group j and the order within the group s to the original type ordering. Clearly we have
(1; 1) = 1 (i.e., (1;1) = 1) and (J; SJ) = H (i.e., 
(J;SJ ) = H). For a group with a single
type, Sj = 1 and 
(j;Sj) = (j;1). In the following we will show that any partition such that
J  3 and (2;1) <  cannot be an equilibrium if 0 is large enough, since this boundary
type (2;1) has incentive to deviate and mimic a type in the rst group. Likewise, for any
partition such that J  3 and (J 1;SJ 1) > , this type (J 1;SJ 1) deviates and mimics a
type in the Jth group.
First, let us denote the expected type of an individual in the jth group by
(j) 
(j;Sj)X
g=(j;1)
gPSj
s=1 
(j;s)
g:
Note that (j) depends only on the parameters of the prior and is independent from the ex
post realization of individual types. As we have seen in (8) this ensures that the variance
of the decision makers policy from the respondents viewpoint does not change according
to his individual message, and thus we can focus on which message induces the closest
expected policy to the respondents ideal policy.
Regardless of the partition of the type space, the ex ante expected type of the individuals
from the decision makers viewpoint is . In other words,
JX
j=1
PSj
s=1 
(j;s)
0
(j) =
HX
i=1
i
0
i = :
Suppose that a respondent has learnt his type, and let us consider from his viewpoint
how the other respondents a¤ect the decision makers belief (and policy). Note that the
partition of types plays an important role because the decision makers Bayesian updating
is based on it. Let zj be the number of respondents in group j. We have
PJ
j=1 z
j = n. If
all respondents follow the partitional strategy, the decision makers policy conditional on
their messages is given by
y(z1; z2; :::; zJ) = ^(z1; z2; :::; zJ) =
JX
j=1
PSj
s=1 
(j;s) + zj
0 + n
(j):
Suppose that all respondents except a follows the partitional strategy and a = 
(2;1) (i.e.
he is the the lowest type in the second group). If this respondent follows the partitional
strategy, the expected policy of the decision maker is given by
2(2) 
JX
j=1
PSj
s=1 
(j;s) + E[zj j i = (2;1)]
0 + n
(j) +
1
0 + n
(2)
=
JX
j=1;j 6=2
PSj
s=1 
(j;s) + (n  1)
PSj
s=1 
(j;s)
0+1
0 + n
(j) +
PS2
s=1 
(2;s) + (n  1)
PS2
s=1 
(2;s)+1
0+1
+ 1
0 + n
(2)
=
0
0 + 1
+
1
0 + 1
(2): (10)
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Since this is a convex combination of the prior expected type  and the expected type of
the group where the respondent belongs to, if (2;1) <  then (2;1) < 2(2).
If the respondent with a = 
(2;1) mimics a respondent in the rst group, then the
expected action of the decision maker is
2(1) =
PS1
s=1 
(1;s) + E[z1 j i = (2;1)] + 1
0 + n
(1) +
JX
j=2
PSj
s=1 
(j;s) + E[zj j i = (2;1)]
0 + n
(j)
=
JX
j=1
PSj
s=1 
(1;s)
0 + 1
(j) +
1
0 + n
(1) +
(n  1)
(0 + n)(0 + 1)
(2)
= 2(2) 
1
0 + n
((2)  (1)): (11)
We now observe that for large enough 0
(2;1) < 2(1) < 2(2); (12)
which implies that the decision makers policy is closer to his ideal when he mimics a
respondent in the rst group whose expected type is lower than his own. Note that from
(6) and (7) the respondents message does not inuence the variance of the decision makers
policy. Thus (12) implies that the expected payo¤ of a respondent in the second group is
higher if he mimics one in the rst group.
Similarly, consider a respondent whose type is the largest in the (J   1)th group:
a = 
(J 1;SJ 1). If (J 1;SJ 1) >  then (J 1;SJ 1) > (J   1). Hence (J 1;SJ 1) > ^2,
which means that from the viewpoint of the respondent (J 1;SJ 1) > , the decision makers
expectation on any other individual is lower than his own type. Therefore, for large enough
0, the decision makers policy is closer to his ideal policy when he mimics a respondent
in the Jth group:
(J 1;SJ 1) > J 1(J) > J 1(J   1): (13)
Hence for any arbitrary partition, if i 6=  for all i and there exists a type of respondent
who does not belong to the rst or the last group, he has incentive to deviate when 0 is
large enough.
The above argument rules out any partitional equilibrium with three or more groups.
Consider the binary partition with only two groups where (1;S1) <  < (2;1). No respon-
dent deviates for 0 above a certain value because mimicking a type in the other group
renders the expected policy further away from their ideal:
1 < ::: < (1;S1) < 1(1) =
0
0 + 1
+
1
0 + 1
(1) (14)
and
1(2) =
0
0 + 1
+
1
0 + 1
(2) < (2;1)::: < H : (15)
Hence we conclude that the only informative equilibrium is binary for large enough 0.
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6.2 Proposition 2
Proof. From (11), (12) and also (13) hold for large enough n, regardless of 0. This rules
out any partitional equilibrium with three or more groups.
A binary partition equilibrium does not exist either, if n is large and 0 is close to 0.
To see this, consider any binary partition where the second group contains two or more
types. Then for 0 close enough to 0
(2;1) < 2(2) =
0
0 + 1
+
1
0 + 1
(2) < (2):
Hence from (11) we have (2;1) < 2(1) < 2(2) in the binary partition when n is large,
which implies that a respondent whose type is (2;1) mimics a respondent in the rst group.
The same argument holds for the rst group if it has two or more types. Therefore, an
equilibrium in partitional strategy does not exist if n is large enough and 0 is close to 0.
This completes the proof of the rst part of the proposition.
Meanwhile, if 0 is not too small, with respect to the binary partition such that (1;S1) <
 < (2;1), both (14) and (15) hold. Therefore Proposition 1 implies that the partition
constitutes an equilibrium for any n, and it is the only informative partitional equilibrium
for large enough n.
7 Appendix II (neologism proofness)
In this appendix we provide details of the example in Section 4, where 1 = 0, 2 = 1=2,
3 = 1 and the expected prior for each type is given by p1 = 2=8, p2 = 5=8, p3 = 1=8. The
prior mean  = 7=16 and hence from the viewpoint of the middle type 2, fully revealing
communication biases the policy lower than the ideal.
First let us consider the condition under which the binary communication equilibrium
exists for any n. Note that, given 2s incentive to exaggerate, the partition in binary
communication must be that f1g; f2; 3g. Using (10), for any n, 2 will not deviate from
this partitional strategy if
bin2 (2) =
0
0 + 1
+
1
0 + 1
(2) =
0
0 + 1
7
16|{z}

+
1
0 + 1
0BB@ 58|{z}
p2
1
2|{z}
2
+
1
8|{z}
p3
1|{z}
3
1CCA 86
=
0
0 + 1
7
16
+
1
0 + 1
7
12
 1
2
, (16)
which holds for 0  4=3. In other words, as long as (16) holds, there exists a binary
equilibrium for any n. For Table 1 both 0 = 7=5 and 0 = 4 satisfy this condition.
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0 = 1
n perfect binary
0  0:0898
7 * 0:0539  0:0643
8 N/A  0:0633
:::
27 N/A  0:0591
28 N/A N/A
!1 N/A N/A
0 = 2:5
n perfect binary
0  0:0898
1 * 0:0825  0:0846
2 * 0:0784  0:0817
3 * 0:0758  0:0799
4 N/A  0:0786
5 N/A  0:0777
!1 N/A * 0:0716
Table 2: Decision makers expected payo¤ (= "social welfare") when 1 = 0; 2 = 1=2; 3 =
0; p1 = 1=8; p2 = 5=8; p3 = 2=8. An asterisk(*) denotes social welfare in neologism proof
equilibrium.
Next, let us consider the condition under which the fully revealing equilibrium exists.
Since  < 2 we can focus on when the middle type mimics the high type 3 in a candidate
equilibrium with full revelation. Again using (10) we can see that, since (1) = 1, (2) =
2, (3) = 3 under full revelation, if the middle type reveals truthfully he induces
perf2 (2) =
0
0 + 1
7
16
+
1
0 + 1
1
2
.
If the middle type mimics 3 then he induces
perf2 (3) =
0
0 + 1
7
16
+
1
0 + 1
1
2| {z }
2(2)
  1
0 + n

1
2
  1

:
The middle type does not deviate if revealing his type induces the expected policy closer
to his ideal i.e.,
1=2  perf2 (2)  1=2  perf2 (3), which (for positive 0 and n) yields
0  1
2

4  n+
p
n2   8n+ 32

 (n): (17)
It is easy to check that, for Table 1, 0 = 1:4 and n  5 satises both (16) and (17), and
hence support the fully revealing equilibrium up to n = 5. Meanwhile if 0 > 4 (17) does
not hold for any n  1. Thus, for example, when 0 = 4:5 a fully revealing equilibrium
does not exist.
The "social welfare" on Table 1 was calculated as follows. For the fully revealing
equilibrium, the decision makers policy conditional on the messages and the prior can be
simplied to the rst order condition with respect to
 
0p1 + x1
0 + n
(y   0)2   
0p2 + x2
0 + n
(y   1=2)2   
0p3 + x3
0 + n
(y   1)2; (18)
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where xi denotes the number of respondents whose type is i. Note that thanks to the
quadratic payo¤s (18) also represents the expected payo¤ of the decision maker conditional
on the binary messages. Therefore, by substituting the optimal policy y into (18) we
obtain the expected payo¤ conditional on the binary messages. The distribution of types
is described by the multivariate Pólya distribution. Note that x3 = n  x1  x2. To obtain
the numbers on the Tables 1 and 2 we calculated
nX
x1=0
n x1X
x2=0
 (0)
 (0 + n)
n!
x1!x2!(n  x1   x2)!
 (0p1 + x1) (0p2 + x2) (0p3 + n  x1   x2)
 (0p1) (0p2) (0p3)
uF (n; x1; x2; p; ); (19)
where uF (n; x1; x2; p; ) is the maximized expression of (18).
For the binary communication equilibrium the decision makers payo¤ is given by
 
0p1 + x1
0 + n
(y   0)2   
0p2 + 0p3 + x2 + x3
0 + n
p2
p2 + p3
(y   1=2)2
 
0p2 + 0p3 + x2 + x3
0 + n
p3
p2 + p3
(y   1)2: (20)
Note that in this case the decision maker cannot distinguish between x2 and x3 when decid-
ing the policy. The social welfare is obtained by calculating (19) by replacing uF (n; x1; x2; p; )
with the maximized expression for (20). For the binary equilibrium with an arbitrarily
large sample, we compute the expected payo¤ when the decision maker has full informa-
tion about the relative sizes of the rst and the second group for any realization of the
type distribution.
7.1 Neologism Proofness
Here we describe how neologism proofness of an equilibrium in the example can be checked,
and also show that if binary equilibrium exists for any n then it is neologism proof for
su¢ ciently large n.
It is clear that the fully revealing equilibrium is neologism proof, because 1 and 3
never prefer to mimic (or to be in a group with) any other type and thus have no incentive
to use a neologism, which in turn means that 2 does not have a credible neologism as it
has to involve pooling with either 1 or 3, or both.
Let us assume (16) holds and consider when the binary communication equilibrium
f1g; f2; 3g, which exists for any n, is neologism proof. Clearly 1 does not have any
incentive to use a neologism. We can also see that 2 does not use a neologism to separate
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himself from 3 since

1
2
 

0
0 + 1
7
16
+
1
0 + 1
7
12

| {z }
bin2 (2)
 <

1
2
 
0BBB@ 00 + 1 716 + 10 + 1 712| {z }
bin2 (2)
  1
0 + n

7
12
  1
2
1CCCA
| {z }
expected action when using the neologism, from (11)

;
which holds for any n if 0  4=3 (recall that bin2 (2) = 1=2 when 0 = 4=3). In other
words, 2 is better o¤ pooling with 3 than to reveal his type by a neologism.
Meanwhile, 3 clearly wishes to separate him from 2 by a neologism. However, it is
not credible if 2 also wishes to convince the decision maker that he is 3, which can be
written
1
2
 

0
0 + 1
7
16
+
1
0 + 1
7
12

| {z }
bin2 (2)
 >

1
2
 
0BBB@ 00 + 1 716 + 10 + 1 712| {z }
bin2 (2)
  1
0 + n

7
12
  1
1CCCA
 :
(21)
For 0 > 4=3, (21) simplies to
n >
 3(0)2 + 140 + 10
30   4 : (22)
Therefore, the neologism proofness of the binary equilibrium for a particular pair of 0
and n can be checked by looking at (21) or alternatively (22), which also implies that if
0 > 4=3 then the binary equilibrium is neologism proof for large enough n. If 0 = 4=3
then (21) is never satised, which implies there is no neologism-proof binary equilibrium
for any n. This is because 2 = 1=2 induces the deal expected action 1=2 for any n in
the equilibrium and hence has no incentive to deviate, which enables 3 to send a credible
neologism.
Finally it is straightforward to see that the "babbling" equilibrium is not neologism
proof. With respect to the uninformative equilibrium, a respondent with 1 has the incen-
tive to separate himself because, if his message is believed, it lowers the policy towards his
ideal. Meanwhile, 2 and 3 prefer the policy induced in the uninformative equilibrium,
namely y = 7=16, to the policy induced by mimicking 1 because the policy in the unin-
formative equilibrium is lower than their ideal policy (1=2 and 1) and mimicking 1 makes
the policy even lower. Therefore, 1 has a credible neologism and hence the "babbling"
equilibrium is not neologism proof.
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